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INTRODUCTION

Islamic veiling is not merely a religious practice, but a highly contested
political symbol within Muslim societies and the global political arena. The
politics of veiling, or covering, have been particularly prominent in Turkey,
a secular democracy in which ninety-nine percent of citizens are Muslim.'
In 1982, Turkey moved to ban headscarves worn for religious purposes in all
universities, both public and private, as well as in government offices.'
Since then, the issue of the headscarf has been a hotly contested and deeply
politicized issue.' Both the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")
and the Turkish Constitutional Court have rejected claims that the ban denies
women their right to religious freedom and education. 4 Instead, both courts
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, West
Virginia University College of Law. I would like to thank the following persons for
sharing their ideas and contributing to the development of this article: Nomaan Hanif,
Nora Onar, Susan Pearce, Halla Shoaibi, and Wafaa Wali. Special thanks to my research
assistant, Olivia Szwalbnest, and to Can Simon of the Harvard Journal of Law and Gender for providing editorial assistance.

'U.S. Department of State, Background Note: Turkey, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/eiU

bgn/3432.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
2 Ay~e Saktanber & Gijl corbacioglu, Veiling and Headscarf-Skepticism in Turkey,
15 Soc. POL.: INT'L STUD. GENDER, ST., & Soc'y 514, 534 (2008).
4'See

JOAN WALLACH Scor, POLITICS OF THE VEIL

1-3 (2007).

See Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 208, 216 (2005); Anayasa
Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], Jun. 5, 2008, Esas No. 2008/16 [Basis Number],
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have held that the ban is a necessary and reasonable response to the threat
allegedly posed by fundamentalist Islam to Turkey's secular democracy.
Most recently, the Turkish Constitutional Court in 2008 annulled amendments to the Turkish Constitution lifting the headscarf ban, holding that the
amendments violated the principles of secularism enshrined in the
Constitution.6
In the United States, most legal scholars have analyzed the issue of

state regulation of veiling within a rights-based framework, focusing on the
individual right to religious freedom and expression.7 Feminist legal scholars similarly have framed the issue within a rights-based paradigm, considering whether the bans violate women's right to religious freedom or right to
gender equality.8 Some feminist scholars have argued that veiling represents
the symbolic and actual subordination of women.9 Adrien Wing, a leading
critical race feminist, has argued that the ban in Turkey is a necessary restriction on women's religious expression in order to protect Turkish democracy

Karar No. 2008/116 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 2008, No. 27032) (Turk.).
5 ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 201-207; Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court],
Jun. 5, 2008, Esas No. 2008/16 [Basis Number], Karar No. 2008/116 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 2008, No. 27032)
(Turk.).
6 See Nurhan Sural, Islamic Outfits in the Workplace in Turkey, A Muslim Majority
Country, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 569, 582 (2009).
1 See generally Karima Bennoune, Secularism and Human Rights: A Contextual
Analysis of Headscarves, Religious Expression, and Women's Equality Under International Law, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 367 (2007) (examining whether it is possible to
harmonize the right to religious freedom with the right to substantive gender equality);
Peter G. Danchin, Suspect Symbols: Value Pluralism as a Theory of Religious Freedom in
InternationalLaw, 33 YALE J. hrr' L. 1 (2009) (discussing the headscarf bans within the
framework of the right to religious freedom in international law); Alain Garay, Blandine
Ch~lini-Pont, Emmanuel Tawil & Zarah Anseur, The Permissible Scope of Legal Limitation on the Freedom of Religion or Belief in France, 19 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 785 (2005)
(discussing French law's restraint on religious freedom); Susanna Mancini, The Power of
Symbols and Symbols as Power: Secularism and Religion as Guarantors of Cultural
Convergence, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 2629, 2630 (2008) (reasoning that "religious symbols
play a peculiar role in identity-related dynamics."); Mukul Saxena, The French Headscarf Law and the Right to Manifest Religious Belief, 84 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 765
(2007) (arguing that the French Headscarf Law violates international law by infringing on
Muslim school children's religious freedom); Adrien Katherine Wing & Ozan 0. Varol, Is
Secularism Possible in a Majority-Muslim Country?: The Turkish Example, 42 TEX. INT'L
L.J. 1 (2006) (arguing that the ban on veiling in Turkey is a necessary limitation on
women's religious freedom).
I See Bennoune, supra note 7 (critiquing the relationship between feminism and religious freedom in the context of the headscarf debate); Rachel Rebouch6, The Substance
of Substantive Equality: Gender Equality and Turkey's HeadscarfDebate, 24 AM. U.
IN_'L. L. Rzv. 711 (2009) (considering whether the headscarf ban advances the substantive equality of women); Wing & Varol, supra note 7.
9 See, e.g., Elene G. Mountis, Cultural Relativity and Universalism: Reevaulating
Gender Rights in a Multicultural Context, 15 DIcK. J. INT'L L. 113, 132 (1997) (explain-

ing that Muslim women "are forced to hide behind their traditional garments and to
shield the world from their 'dangerous' sexuality").
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from extreme Islamic fundamentalists who seek to transform Turkey into a
religious state.' 0
The interpretation of state regulation of covering within a rights-based
perspective appears natural when viewed through the lens of a Western legal
scholar within a liberal democratic tradition. This legal academic debate,
however, ignores the nature of the headscarf as a gendered symbol and a site
for conflicting claims of national and global geopolitical identity. Veiling
has multiple meanings that can be understood only by closely examining its
social and historical context in a particular location and time. The headscarf
is not solely a religious symbol or practice, nor its regulation merely an issue
of individual rights or liberty. In Turkey, the headscarf is a powerful symbol
used to construct power relations between men and women, between secularists and Islamists, between the West and political Islam."
Masculinities theory, I argue, offers a critical lens through which to
reconsider the headscarf and its relationship to gender, political power, and
the state. Like feminist theory, masculinities theory assumes that gender is a
social practice constructed by and between men and women as well as

See Wing & Varol, supra note 7, at 47.
" (nar
argues that "the new state instituted its secularism through the unveiling of
the female body, [and] the Islamist elite of the 1990s instituted their Islamism by reveiling the female body, similarly using the body and its clothing as a site from which their
nationalist project was articulated." ALEV (;INAR, MODERNITY, ISLAM, AND SECULARISM
IN TURKEY 74 (2005). Both groups, (;9nar argues, used the veil to vest themselves with
political agency at the expense of women, defining men as the protectors and saviors of
women. Id. at 86-87. At the global level, the veil also symbolizes the struggle between
the West and Islamism. As (9nar argues, "[t]he image of the veiled woman has become
one of the most powerful tropes of Islamic fundamentalism in the Western media, becoming a more potent symbol of Islam than the mosque." Id. at 75. Because the veil draws
attention to what is hidden and inaccessible, it "allows for the mystification of political
Islam, conveniently making it project fear and threat." Id.; see also Caroline Nagel,
Introduction to GEOGRAPHIES OF MUSLIM WOMEN: GENDER, RELIGION, AND SPACE 1, 1-3
(Ghazi-Walid Falah & Caroline Nagel eds., Guilford Press 2005); Anna Secor, Islamism,
Democracy, and the Political Productionof the HeadscarfIssue in Turkey, in GEOGRAPHIES OF MUSLIM WOMEN: GENDER, RELIGION, AND SPACE, supra, at 203-225; Ye§im Arat,
Group-Differentiated Rights and the Liberal Democratic State: Rethinking the Headscarf
Controversy in Turkey, 25 NEw PERSPECTIVES ON TURKEY 31 (2001) at 31-46; Saktanber
& Corbacioglu, supra note 2, at 517 (explaining that "the Islamic headscarf has almost
become a trope to denote the problems intrinsic to the foundations of the republic and its
secular regime"); Nora Onar, Freedom of Religion v. Secularism?: Universal Rights,
Turkish Islamism, and the HeadscarfBan, (Eur. & the Mediterranean Convergence, Con-

flicts & Crisis Working Paper Series, RAMSES Working Paper No. 8/07, 2007), 15-16,
availableat http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/ramses/onar.pdf (arguing that "[t]he headscarf
or lack thereof became a powerful symbol of the exclusion of Islamic values from the
lifelines of the state" and that, to supporters of the ban, veiling "represent[s] a symbolic
challenge to the secular body politic"). G61e argues, "when the veiling of women is
claimed as the symbol of Islamic movements, what is actually being acted out is the
intersection of political ideology and the power relations between the sexes." NILOFER
GOLE, THE FORBIDDEN MODERN: CIVILIZATION AND VEILING 136 (1996). The emergence
of veiled women, while arguably enforcing the segregation between the sexes in Islam,
also rejects their confinement to the private sphere and "transforms existing relations
between men and women." Id. at 139-40.
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within particular social institutions, including the state. 2 Men and masculinities are not fixed or unitary, but rather multiple and fluid, varying "across
time (history) and space (cultures), within societies, and through life courses
and biographies."' 3 The headscarf debate in Turkey reveals how masculinities construct gender within a range of social institutions, including the state
and transnational relations of power, through the regulation of women's bodies. Islamic covering is a gendered practice that "is instrumental in conveying political meanings."' 4 In Turkey, the headscarf issue is a proxy for
political struggle between secularists and Islamists. 5 Covering constructs
boundaries of identity and difference-boundaries between men and women, between Turkish secular elites and political
Islamic leaders, and be6
tween the global West and transnational Islam.'
Yet women have been critical agents in this debate. As Turkish scholar
Nilfifer Gole argues, "[v]eiling is the most salient emblem and women the
newest actors of contemporary Islamism."' 7 Assuming that gender is constructed relationally, masculinities theory needs to consider women as active
agents who negotiate their identity in a particular social and historical space.
The question then arises, how do women respond to the gendered relations
of power constructed by competing masculinities?
While many Western and indeed some Kemalist feminist scholars portray Turkish women as passive victims compelled to cover by a patriarchal
religion or political movement, G61e and other Turkish scholars have focused on the diversity of veiling practices among women based on their
membership in different social and economic classes, their regional origin,
and their religious commitments. 18 Their research suggests that a certain
group of women-young, urban, and typically the daughters of migrants
from rural areas-deliberately embraced the choice to cover, challenging the
secular elites as a political matter. 19These women challenged both the secular construction of the headscarf as a means of Islamic male oppression, as
well as the Islamist masculinist construction of the veil as protector of wo' 2 R.W. CONNELL, MASCUtLINrrms 67-74 (1995).
'3R.W. Connell, Jeff Hearn & Michael S. Kimmel, Introduction to HANDBOOK OF
STuoms ON MEN & MASCuLINrrIES 1, 3 (Michael S. Kimmel, Jeff Hearn, & R.W. Connell
eds., 2005).
14 GOLE,

supra note 11, at 4.

11 use the terms "secularist" and "Islamist" recognizing the complexity of labeling
within the Turkish context, where secularism is based upon state control over religion and
the removal of religion from the public sphere, and where the AKP claims it seeks to
reconcile Islam with Western democracy. See Siiral, supra note 6, at 570-72.
16 See I NAR, supra note 11, at 74-75 (2005); GOLE, supra note 11, at 1-6.
7
' GOLE, supra note 11, at 1.
's See 1INAR, supra note 11, at 59-65; GOLE, supra note 11, at 88-104 (arguing that
veiled university students "embody the urban, educated, and militant new countenance of
Islam"); Ozlem Sandikci & Guiliz Ger, Veiling in Style: How Does a Stigmatized Practice
Become Fashionable?,37 J. CONSUMER Ras. (forthcoming June 2010), availableat http://
ssrn.com/abstract= 150746, 29-30.
"9See GOLE, supra note 11, at 88-104.
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men's modesty and place in the mahrem, or domestic sphere. 20 Their choice
to cover undercuts the secular construction of femininity that assumes that
young women who cover are Islamic political pawns. At the same time,
their political participation undercuts the Islamic construction of femininity
21
that locates women within the private sphere.
Part I of this Article examines the decisions of the Turkish Constitutional Court and the ECHR holding that the ban was a legitimate limitation
on women's religious freedom that was reasonably necessary to protect Turkish secularism from the threat of radical Islam. 22 In each of these cases, the
court ignored the issue of women's autonomy and agency, assuming that
women are victims of radical Islam rather than political actors whose dress
is both religious and political. Part II discusses the social and political context of the Turkish ban on veiling, locating it as a regulatory practice that
employs women's bodies as the site for competing nationalist masculinities
through history-during the Ottoman Empire, the subsequent creation of the
Turkish Republic, and the present struggle between secularists and Islamists.
Throughout history, the bodies of Turkish women were symbolic sites for
political struggles within Turkey and within the global community.2 3 Part III
explores the role of Turkish women in the current debate over the headscarf.

20

Gole explains:

Islamic women who have used the "opportunity realm" granted to women by
Kemalism have rejected Islamic prohibitions and have subverted the established
relations between men and women in the mahrem sphere as well as increased
their own participation in the public realm. As it is different from Kemalist feminism, it is troubling for these women to speak out about their demands for participation in the social life, since it requires subversion of the prevalent gender
relations embedded in the private sphere.
GOLE,
21

supra note 11, at 140.

Gole argues that these women simultaneously challenge the secularist effort to

keep Islam from the public sphere of the universities and government while also confronting Islamist ideology by their "exit from the mahrem," which:

forces women to question traditional gender identities and male definitions of
"licit" and "illicit" behavior, thereby unveiling relations of power between Islamist men and women. Criticizing the "pseudoprotectionism" of Muslim men,
veiled women claim their right to "acquire personality"-that is, a "life of their
own"-and, consequently, provoke disorder in Islamic gender definitions and
identifies.
GOLE,
22 supra note 11, at 22.
Leyla $ahin v. Turkey, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 175, 208 (2005) (holding that the Turkish
ban did not violate female medical student's right to religious freedom); Anayasa

Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], Jun. 5, 2008, Esas No. 2008/16 [Basis Number],
Karar No. 2008/116 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 2008, No. 27032) (Turk.).
23 See GOLE, supra note 11, at 5 (arguing that the headscarf dispute in Turkey post-

1983 "is considered as a manipulative tool of the rising Islamist fundamentalist movement and, consequently, has provoked a very polarized political dispute between secularists and Islamists").
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AND TURKISH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: COVERING AS

ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND THREAT
TO SECULARIST DEMOCRACY

Islamic veiling, or covering, is not unitary or fixed but differs in form
and practice. Sura XXIV, Verse 31 of the Qu'ran is read to require women
to cover:
And say to the believing women / That they should lower / Their
gaze and guard / Their modesty; that they / Should not display
their / Beauty and ornaments except / What (must ordinarily) ap-

pear / Therof; that they should / Draw their veils over / Their
bosoms and not display / Their beauty except / To their husbands,
their fathers / Their husbands' fathers, their sons / Their husbands'
sons / Their brothers or their brothers' sons, / Or their sisters' sons,
/ Or their women, or the slaves / Whom their right hands / Possess,
or male servants / Free of physical needs, / Or small children who /
Have no sense of the shame / Of sex; and that they / Should not

strike their feet / In order to draw attention / To their hidden ornaments. / And 0 ye Believers! / Turn ye all together / Towards God,
that ye / May attain Bliss. 24
Another verse states:
O Prophet! Tell / Thy wives and daughters, / And the believing
women, / That they should cast / Their outer garments over / Their
persons (when abroad): / That is most convenient, / That they
should be known / (As such) and not molested. / And God is OftForgiving, / Most Merciful.2 5
Veiling removes the physical attributes and beauty of women from the

gaze of men, instead reserving their beauty for the private sphere of the
home, and thereby protects men from temptation.2 6 The Qu'ran does not
mandate any more specific types of dress.27 Fikih, the books of law, prescribe the manner of veiling, requiring that the hair, head, and neck be covered (called hijab in Arabic) and a long cloak or dress worn loosely over
clothes (jilbab)2 8 Islamic scholars and feminists, however, debate whether
women must cover their heads and, if so, the specific manner of covering.2 9
24

1987).
25

THE HOLY QUR'AN

904-05 (Abdullah Yusef Ali trans., Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, Inc.

Id. at 1126-27.

26 GOLE, supra note 11, at 93.
27 Nusrat Choudhury, From the

Stasi Commission to the European Court of Human
Rights: L'Affaire Du Foulardand the Challenge of Protecting the Rights of Muslim Girls,
16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 199, 217-18 (2007).
28 FADWA EL GUNDI, VEIL: MODESTY, PRIVACY AND RESISTANCE

139 (1999);

GOLE,

supra
29 note 11, at 93.
Id. at 218 n.76 (citing examples of the range of Islamic interpretations of veiling).
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Covering practices differ across time, place, class, and particular religious
interpretations.3 0
In Turkey, approximately seventy percent of Turkish women cover their
heads, a percentage that varies widely depending on region and class.3' Unlike women in Afghanistan, who primarily wear the burqa, a black or dark2
colored garment that covers the head, face, and body except for the hands,
less than three percent of women in Turkey wear this form of Islamic attire,
33
Instead, women in Turkey wear multiple forms
which they call the Cartaf.
of cover that differ according to time and place-ranging from simple headscarves to Islamic high couture debuted on the catwalk at fashion shows in
34

Istanbul.

Rural women and elderly women often wear a traditional scarf, known
as the batdrtiisii,which loosely covers the hair and is tied under the chin.35
In the 1980s, a different form of covering, called the tfirban, emerged that
"reflect[ed] both changing class dynamics and the politicization of Islam in
Turkey."36 This style of covering, also known as tessetur, included larger
scarves draped over the neck and shoulders and worn with shapeless overcoats.3 7 Since then, "softer," more urban forms of tessetur have followed.3"
While urban, working poor women in Istanbul still wear the formless overcoat, many younger women, as discussed more fully in Part HI below, have
replaced the overcoat with more narrow versions or wear a tunic over pants
or jeans3

9

In Turkey, regulation of veiling has differed over time. The Ottoman
Empire, which incorporated Islamic law, issued various decrees requiring
veiling and prohibiting certain forms of attire for women that were considered inconsistent with Islam.40 In 1923, Mustafa Kemal, known as "Ata-41
tirk," established the Turkish Republic as a secular democratic state.
Atattirk instituted a number of reforms that sought to eradicate Islam from
the public sphere and replace Islam with Westernized culture. 42 To Atatuirk,
veiling by Muslim women was "backward" and incompatible with a mod-

EL GuIDnDi, supra note 28, at 11-12; Choudhury, supra note 27, at 217-18; Secor,
supra note 11, at 208.
"' Secor, supra note 11, at 207-08.
32 Behind the Burqa: A Woman Photographer'sView of Afghanistan, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 22, 2008, http://blogs.nationalgeographic.com/blogs/news/chiefeditor/
2008/10/behind-the-burqa.html.
13 Secor, supra note 11, at 207-08.
14 Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18; Secor, supra note 11, at 207-08.
35Secor, supra note 11, at 207-08.
36 Id.
37Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18.
38 Id. (discussing the "softening" of tessetur).
39Id.; see supra Part III.
40See Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18.
"' Secor, supra note 11, at 206.
42 Saktanber & Corbacioglu, supra note 2, at 517; Secor, supra note 11, at 206.
30
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ern, Western society. 43 While Atatfirk did not issue a national ban on veiling, he and his followers ("Kemalists") urged its removal, and many local
authorities prohibited the practice. 4
Despite the state's efforts, veiling did not disappear, particularly in rural
areas. 45 As rural Muslims began to migrate to Istanbul and other urban areas, a growing working and middle class began to emerge, appearing in pub-46
lic spaces, such as universities, wearing the new form of cover, the turban.
In response, Turkey imposed a ban on the wearing of headscarves in universities and public offices in 1982. 47 During the mid-1980s, the headscarf ban
became a flashpoint for conflict between secularists and Islamists in Turkey,
as protests against the ban increased. 48 Turkish secularists supported the ban,
perceiving student activism as a symbol of political Islam that threatened to
destroy Turkey's secular democracy. 49 In response, Islamic political parties
in Turkey similarly claimed veiled women as the symbolic embodiment of
Islam.5 0
The universities soon became the site for the confrontation between Islamists and secular elites. In the mid-1980s, female university students in
Istanbul began challenging the ban, arguing that it violated their right to
religious freedom. These young women participated in protests and dem43 Saktanber & Corbacioglu, supra note 2, at 517 (explaining that veiling was inconsistent with the new Republic's goal of becoming part of "contemporary (read 'European') civilization").
" CINAR, supra note 11, at 59, 62-64 (discussing rhetorical campaign to encourage
women to unveil and appear in public as "modem" women); GOLE, supra note 11, at 73;
Onar, supra note 11, at 11 (noting that the Islamic veil was strongly discouraged by the
early Turkish Republic).
41 Secor, supra note 11, at 207.
46See GOLE, supra note 11, at 90-91; Secor, supra note 11, at 207.
41 Saktanber & 4(orbacioglu, supra note 2, at 534.
48 qINAR, supra note 11, at 75 ("The use of the Islamic headscarf as part of the new
veiling has been the central focus of political controversies in Turkey since it first became
a matter of public debate in the mid-1980s."); Secor, supra note 11, at 203.
41 (INAR, supra note 11, at 75, 172-73.
50 qinar explains that the Refah Party:

used the opportunity to define the headscarf controversy as a battle between secularism and Islamism, thereby turning the headscarf into the standard marking the
battlefield on which their own battle would be fought .... Islamist writers started
to call "all Muslims" to rally behind the headscarf, which, according to a columnist, was "akin to the national flag."
QINAR, supra note 11, at 85. The Islamic nationalist movement's premise was that Turkey
was "inherently and unarguably Muslim, and therefore its people deserved to live in
accordance with Islamic values, norms, and principles." Id. at 86; see also Arat, supra
note 11, at 37-38.
"' Ynar explains that "[clontrary to secularist expectations, these students did not
resort to Koranic references or to requirements of a pious Muslim lifestyle in defense of
their choice to wear the headscarf, but rather evoked liberal democratic values, namely
freedom of conscience and individual rights." CINAR, supra note 11, at 82-83; Ye~im
Arat, Feminists, Islamists, and Political Change in Turkey, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 117, 126
(1998) (arguing that by wearing headscarves in universities, Islamist women "relied on
their constitutional rights to practice religion without obstruction as they sought legitimacy for the wearing of headscarves in public institutions").
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onstrations at universities and hunger strikes to persuade state officials to
eliminate the ban.5" In response, the Higher Education Council twice removed restrictions on wearing the headscarf, in 1989 and 1991.11 The Turkish Constitutional Court, however, annulled both repeal attempts, holding on
March 7, 1989 that secularism was an essential condition for democracy and
that, "[iun a secular regime, religion is shielded from a political role. '5 4 The
Court concluded that:
The headscarf and the particular style of clothing that accompanies it, which lacks a modem appearance, is not an exemption
but a tool of segregation.... This situation, which is the display
of a pre-modem image, is increasingly becoming widespread and
this is unacceptable in terms of the principles of secularism, reformism and the Republic. Using democratic principles to challenge secularism is the abuse of freedom of religion.55
Women and conservative Islamic political parties continued to agitate
for repeal of the ban. A female medical student, Leyla ahin, challenged the
headscarf ban in the ECHR, alleging that it violated her right to religious
freedom and right to education under the Convention of European Human
Rights.56 *ahin was a medical student at Istanbul University and was denied
access to examinations because she was wearing a headscarf5 7 Because she
refused to comply with the dress code and remove her headscarf, the university brought disciplinary proceedings against her and issued a warning.58
Later, she participated in an unauthorized assembly outside the dean's office
at the university to protest against the headscarf ban.5 9 The dean of the
faculty began disciplinary proceedings against the students who joined the
assembly and suspended ahin for a semester.60 ahin applied to the Istanbul Administrative Court for an order quashing the suspension, but it was
dismissed.6' The Supreme Administrative Court subsequently held that it
62
was unnecessary to examine the merits of her appeal.

52 ;INAR, supra note 11, at 82.
53Id. at 83.
4 Leyla ahin v. Turkey, 11 Eur.

Ct. H.R. 175, 188 (2005). Anayasa Mahkemesi
[Constitutional Court], Mar. 7, 1989, Esas No. 1989/1 [Basis Number], Karar No. 1989/

12 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey],
1989, No. 20216, Safya No. 25 [page]) (Turk.).
" Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], Mar. 7, 1989, Esas No. 1989/1 [Basis Number], Karar No. 1989/12 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 1989, No. 20216) (Turk.); see also qINAR, supra note 11, at
83. 56
$ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 182.

11
Saktanber & 4;orbacioglu, supra note 2, at 529.
58
5ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 182.
59Id.

6 Id.
6'
62 Id. at 182-83.

Id. at 183.
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Before the ECHR, ahin alleged a violation of Article 9 of the Convention, which guarantees the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.63 In particular, Article 9 guarantees a person the freedom "to
manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance." 6 However, the right of religious freedom is not absolute; states
may impose "such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in
a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of
public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and free'65
doms of others.
The ECHR held that, under Article 9, a state may place restrictions on
the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief where necessary to ensure
the protection of the religious beliefs of all citizens.6 6 Moreover, Article 9
"does not always guarantee the right to behave in a manner governed by a
religious belief ...and does not confer on people who do so the right to
disregard rules that have proved to be justified. ' 67 Therefore, the Turkish
ban on headscarves did not violate Article 9. In its decision, the Court deferred to the judgment of Turkish Constitutional Court and state officials as
to the alleged threat the headscarf posed to its secular democracy. The
Grand Chamber found that the headscarf is a "powerful external symbol"
that "appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard
6
to reconcile with the principle of gender equality.
In its analysis, the Grand Chamber implicitly rejected the argument that
ahin, a well-educated woman, chose to cover by her own accord. In a
dissent to the Grand Chamber opinion, Judge Tulkens observed that the judgment did not address the argument that ahin did not cover in order to protest secularism, which ahin, in fact, supported. 69 Judge Tulkens noted that
ahin testified that she wore the headscarf "of her own free will."70 As
Judge Tulkens observed, "[n]ot all women who wear the headscarf are fundamentalists and there is nothing to suggest that [ahin] held fundamentalist
views.""

The Grand Chamber also rejected ahin's argument that the ban vio2
lated her right to education guaranteed by Article 2 of the Convention.
While the Court recognized the importance of the right to education, it held
63 Id. at 179; United Nations Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 9, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
64 United Nations Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 63, at art. 9.
65

Id.

6 5ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 202-03.
67 Id. at 208 (citation omitted).
68 Id. at 205 (citation omitted).
IId. at 223 (Tulkens, J.,dissenting).
dissenting).
70 Id. at 226 (Tulkens, J.,
71Id. at 225 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 216; Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 63, at art. 2.
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that this right is not absolute and is subject to regulation by the State.73 The
Court reasoned that the restriction was foreseeable to those concerned and
was enacted through the legitimate aims of protecting the rights and free74
doms of others and maintaining public order.
In 2007, the Justice and Development Party ("AKP"), a moderate Islamist political party,75 won forty-seven percent of the popular vote in national elections.76 The AKP sought to challenge the headscarf ban, not as a
matter of religion but as a violation of basic rights.7 7 With its support, in
2008 the Turkish parliament voted to amend the Turkish Constitution to repeal the ban on headscarves.18 These amendments were immediately challenged by the secularist party ("CHP"). The Turkish Constitutional Court
subsequently voted 9-2 that the constitutional amendments ending the ban
were unlawful on the grounds that they violated the constitutional principle
79
of secularism.
By conflating the veil with radical Islam, and assuming that women are
political or religious pawns, both the ECHR and the Turkish Constitutional
Court erase Islamic women as active agents and political participants from
the debate. 80 The Grand Chamber in ahin defers to the opinions of the
Turkish Constitutional Court and the Republic in conceptualizing Islamic
attire as a radical threat to secular democracy.8 ' In so doing, the decision
does not critically question Turkey's categorization of political Islam as a
fundamentalist and radical movement aiming to destroy democracy.
Both the ECHR and the Turkish Constitutional Court ignore the relationship between the headscarf and the discursive use of women's bodies by
both Turkish secularists and Islamic political parties. Both courts ignore the
7 ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 214.
14 Id. at 216.
71See Onar, supra note 11, at 13-15 (explaining that the AKP "party programme
identified the individual rather than the Koran as the basis for being and action, religiosity
was to be expressed within a secular framework, and universal human rights ... as well
as women's rights were extolled").
76Sliral, supra note 6, at 574.
17 Omit Cizre & Menderes Qinar, Turkey 2002: Kemalism, Islamism, and Politics in
Light of the February 28 Process, 102 S. ATLANTIC Q. 309, 327 (2003).
78 Turkey: Constitutional Court Ruling Upholds Headscarf Ban, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, June 6, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/484cee95c.html.
79Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court], Jun. 5, 2008, Esas No. 2008/16 [Basis Number], Karar No. 2008/116 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 2008, No. 27032) (Turk.).
10Indeed, $ahin illustrates Western essentialization of both Islam and Muslim societies. See Asef Bayat, The Use and Abuse of "Muslim Societies", ISIM NEWSL. (International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World, Leiden, Neth.), Dec. 2003, at
5 (arguing that the West tends to adopt a concept of Islamism and "Muslim societies"
that are unitary and totalizing and, as such, deny the diversity of Islamic cultures and
particular Muslim communities).
"' ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 204-05; Anayasa Mahkemesi [Constitutional Court],
Jun. 5, 2008, Esas No. 2008/16 [Basis Number], Karar No. 2008/116 [Decision Number] (TC Resmi Gazete [Official Gazette of Republic of Turkey], 2008, No. 27032)
(Turk.).
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multiple meanings of the headscarf, choosing to accept the secularist and
Western conceptions of the headscarf as embodying a radical form of Islam
that seeks to destroy secularism. Within these decisions, Leyla ahin and
other women who choose to cover are invisible. Neither court analyzes their
motives nor the actual effect of their decision to cover. Instead, both courts
implicitly accept the claim by secularists and Islamic political parties that a
woman's decision to cover has the power to destroy both the Turkish Republic and Islamic society. Rather than treat women who cover as autonomous
individuals, both courts implicitly assume that women are pawns of political
Islam or subordinated within Islamic patriarchy. At the same time that the
courts disregard the real women behind the veil, they also overlook the political motives of the men who use the headscarf as a symbolic tool to gain
political power within Turkey and the West.

II.

BEYOND A RIGHTS-BASED ANALYSIS:

MASCULINITIES THEORY

AND THE HEADSCARF DEBATE

Rather than conceptualize the headscarf debate as an issue of individual
rights, masculinities theory offers a methodology to understand veiling as a
gendered practice that constructs masculinity, the nation, and global relations of power. Feminists have long recognized that gender, and women's
bodies in particular, have been used to demarcate the boundaries of collective identities.8 2 Throughout history, veiling has been used to control women's bodies as a means to construct competing national, ethnic, religious,
and political identities. As feminist geographer Anna Secor writes, "veiling
is an embodied spatial practice through which women are inserted into relations of power in society."83 Masculinities theory reveals the ways competing masculinities have sought to regulate the practice of veiling to achieve
national and political power.
A.

Masculinities Theory and National Identity

Masculinities theory examines gender in relation to structures of
power-power within the state, the nation, and the world order. According
to social scientist R.W. Connell, gender is one means of structuring social
practice that necessarily interacts with other social practices such as race,
class, nationality, and position within the world order.84 Like feminist theories, masculinities theory has shifted the focus from individual gender differences to socially constructed gender relations.

82 See NMRA YUVAL-DAvIS, GENDER & NATION 23 (1997) (discussing role of gender
and gender symbols as symbolic border guards for social collectivities).
83Secor, supra note 11, at 204.
' CONNELL, supra note 12, at 75.
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Masculinities theory provides a complex understanding of the concrete
ways in which power is negotiated in society. Masculinities research has
focused on the construction of masculinity in particular times and spaces. 5
The methodology has been primarily ethnographic, focusing on the particular processes of construction of masculinity in local sites. 6 Moving beyond
ethnographic studies of the local, Michael Kimmel and others have focused
on the historical and cultural constructions of masculinity and gender within
nations and larger societies.8 7 Masculinity theorists have asked critical questions about the gendered nature of political struggle between competing
groups of men over national identity and state formation. For example, in
his book, Changing Men in Southern Africa, Robert Morrell explores the

competing masculinities of Zulu and Afrikaaner men during the struggle
against apartheid in South Africa.88 His volume juxtaposes a study of Zulu
nationalism by Thembisa Waetjen and Gerhard Mar6 89 with a study by
Kobus du Pisani of the transformation of Afrikaaner masculinities during
and after apartheid. 9° These studies explore the relationship between gender
and nationalism, specifically focusing on how gender and masculinity have
been employed to construct and resist racialized power.
In a recent piece, Connell argues that masculinities theory must begin
to focus on the relationship between local constructions of masculinity and
the broader geopolitical order. 91 As Connell explains, "masculinities and
femininities are produced together in the process that constitutes a gender
order." 92 Building on the notion that institutions, including the workplace
and the state, are gendered, Connell argues that international relations, trade,
and markets are "inherently ... area[s] of gender politics." 93 Connell concludes that a world gender order exists, defined as the structure of relation-

" See Connell, supra note 13, at 71.
Id.
" See generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD
86

IN

AMERICA (1996);

MRINALINI SINHA,

COLONIAL MASCULINITY: THE 'MANLY ENGLISHMAN' AND THE 'EFFEMINATE

BENGALI' IN

LATE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1995) (arguing that the images of the "manly Englishman" and the "effeminate Bengali" were employed to uphold colonial privilege and
contain resistance); Thokozani Xaba, Masculinity and Its Malcontents: The Confrontation
Between "Struggle Masculinity" and "Post-Struggle Masculinity" (1990-1997), in
CHANGING MEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 105, 107-19 (Robert Morrell ed., 2001) (arguing
THE

that the armed struggle by resistance fighters against apartheid produced a generation of
men who were used to violence and lacked formal education and work experience, producing a particular form of masculinity in South Africa).
88 Xaba, supra note 87, at 107-19.
89

Thembisa Waetjen & Gerhard Mard, 'Men amongst Men': Masculinity and Zulu
Nationalism in the 1980s, in CHANGING MEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 87, at 195.
0 Kobus du Pisani, Puritanism Transformed: Afrikaner Masculinities in the
Apartheid and Post-Apartheid Period, in CHANGING MEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra
note 87, at 157.
91R.W. Connell, Globalization, Imperialism, and Masculinities, supra note 85, at
71-72.
92
Id. at 72.
93 Id.
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ships that interconnect the gender regimes9 4 of institutions, and the gender
orders of local societies, on a world scale.
To understand this gender order, Connell argues one must consider the
historical relationship between imperialism, colonialism, and globalization
on the one hand, and local societies on the other.95 Noting that the discussion of masculinities in the transnational arena is rare, Connell offers an
analysis of the development of so-called "globalizing masculinities"
through colonization, the transition to postcolonial regimes, and globalization. 96 He argues that each stage of this development affected gender relations at the local or national level, often leading to the reconstruction of local
masculinities in ways that significantly affect women's position within the
97
gender order.
Joane Nagel's work on masculinities and the nation exemplifies this approach. Nagel argues that masculinity is a powerful hegemonic force in nationalism, defined as "a goal (to achieve statehood) and a belief (in a
collective commonality)." 9 Nagel's analysis draws upon the work of
Cynthia Enloe, one of the first feminists to consider the relationship between
masculinity and nationhood. 99 Enloe wrote about the gendered nature of nationalism in Bananas, Beaches and Bases, claiming that "nationalism typically has sprung from masculinized memory, masculinized humiliation and
masculinized hope."' ° While men have served as the actors defending their
freedom, honor, or nation, women have typically served as largely passive,
symbolic icons of nationhood.10' Women's purity thus becomes identified
with national honor-"women's shame is the family's shame, the nation's
shame, the man's shame."'' 2
Turkish scholar Alev (inar similarly argues that hegemonic masculinity
regulates the female body, and through its regulation, constructs itself as
dominant and powerful. 03 By regulating the bodies of women, this dominant or hegemonic masculinity simultaneously "legitimizes its power and
authority to intervene with regard to bodies, construct the national subject,
and dictate the boundaries of the public and the private spheres."'3 4 In this
way, the female body symbolizes the nation and women become its "symbolic border guards."' 15
94Id.
91Id. at 72-73.
96Id. at 74-81.
97Id.
98

Joane Nagel, Nation,
note 13, at 397, 400.

in HANDBOOK OF STUDIES ON MEN & MASCULINITIES, supra

99See CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1990).
100id. at 45.

BEACHES AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF

See Nagel, supra note 98, at 405.

0..

102Id.

103IINAR,

supra note 11, at 58-59.

'mId. at 59.
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Id. at 60.
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While recognizing that women's role in constructing national identities
is often symbolic, Anthias and Yuval-Davis identify a broader range of ways
in which women have tended to participate in ethnic, national, and state
processes and practices. 106 Specifically, women act:
(a) as biological producers of members of ethnic collectivities; (b)
as reproducers of the [normative] boundaries of ethnic/national
groups [by enacting proper feminine behavior]; (c) as participating centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and
as transmitters of its culture; (d) as signifiers of ethnic/national
differences . . . [and] (e) as participants in national, economic,
political, and military struggles. 107

Exploring the relationship between gender, masculinity, and the state
helps illuminate the specific means through which hegemonic masculinity
and political power are constructed and preserved. This approach is particularly useful in analyzing the role of women and gender in situations of conflict, where women's bodies serve as guardians of collective, and contested,
identity. 108 Combined, masculinities theory and feminist theory contribute to
a more complex understanding of the institutionalized structures of power
that construct gender relations between men and women at the local, national, and global levels.
B.

Masculinities and the HeadscarfDebate in Turkey

As Nagel argues, the "politicization of women's bodies and the politics
of the veil in Islamic societies" are examples of the assertion of masculinity
and "nationhood through the control over women's bodies."'0 9 Within Turkey, both hegemonic masculinities and Islamic masculinities of resistance
have used the female body and the headscarf debate to construct and embody competing national and political identities. Women, however, have
been active participants in the veiling debate.
The Islamic headscarf historically has been used to embody both Islam
and Turkish secularism. In pre-Republic Turkey, the Ottoman Empire, relying on Islamic law, regulated women's veiling and attire, as well as their
presence in the public sphere." 0 The Ottoman Empire required women to
veil beginning in the sixteenth century."' As a social practice, Islamic veiling constructs gender relations within the community. According to G6le,
16 Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, Introduction to WOMAN - NATION - STATE 1,
6-14 (Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias, eds., 1989).
107 Id. at 7.
"o8
See Robina Mohammad, NegotiatingSpaces of the Home, Education System, and
the Labor Market, in GEOGRAPHIES OF MUSLIM WOMEN: GENDER, RELIGION, AND SPACE
178, 182-83 (Ghazi-Walid Falah & Caroline Nagel, eds., 2005).
'0 See Nagel, supra note 98, at 405.
°GOLE, supra note 11, at 72.
Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18.

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

[Vol. 33

veiling fulfills three purposes that serve Islam: (1) it conceals women from
the gaze of men; (2) it sets boundaries between men and women; and (3) it
demarcates the "forbidden sphere," which is to remain private. 112 Gole argues that Islamic clothing rules are based on the differentiation and segregation of the sexes: "veiling represents hidden femininity, the beard represents
a man's masculinity."'" 3 These rules in turn construct and preserve the segregation of the sexes as well as the separation of the private world, or
mahrem, and the public sphere.' '4
As G6le explains, "[t]he Islamic social order measures its integrity by
the honor of its women, which requires, in turn, the untouchability as well as
invisibility of women.""' The social system thus exercises control over women's sexuality and segregation of the sexes, both of which are fundamental
aspects of Islamic masculinities in Turkey. Within this social order, veiling
maintains the boundaries of separation between the sexes and preserves order in the community." 6
While Muslim societies such as the Ottoman Empire used the veil to
construct gender relations, Western colonial and imperialist powers seized
upon the veil to symbolize Islam and Muslims as inherently different, backward, and inferior." 7 Colonialism began to construct the narrative of the veil
as a means of oppression of women, a practice that the West decried as
symbolizing the barbarism and backwardness of Muslim societies.'
As
women's studies and religion scholar Leila Ahmed explains, "the peculiar
practices of Islam with respect to women had always formed part of the
Western narrative of the quintessential otherness and inferiority of Islam."''119
Colonialists seized upon the veil as the "most visible marker of the
differentness and inferiority of Islamic societies," a symbol of both the degradation of Islamic women and the backwardness of Islamic men. 20 This
Western interpretation of gender relations between Islamic men and women
constructed Muslim men as barbaric oppressors of women, inherently inferior to Western men.' 2' At the same time, colonial hegemonic masculinity
constructed itself as the savior of Islamic women, the enlightened and powsupra note 11, at 94.
"1 Id.at 93.
114Id. at 94.
115Id. at 72-73.
116 GOLE, supra note 11, at 93. A Turkish student who covers explained, for example:
112 GOLE,

People in the West manifest their sexuality in an enlarged dimension through embellishing themselves, but this in fact impoverishes sexuality. We do the opposite
of what they do at all possible levels, and we confine sexuality to certain spheres
as much as we can. That is, we try to take sexuality away from attention in the
outside life, the streets, and in the public realm.
Id.
17

1 LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND GENDER IN ISLAM
8
1 1d

" 90 Id. at 149
12 1d. at 152.
121

Id. at 153.

151-53 (1992).
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erful rescuer of the female victims of the culturally and racially inferior Islamic men. Western masculinity thus justified its economic and political
domination of Muslim societies through the veil, which symbolized the in2
feriority and inherent "Otherness" of Islam.
Shahim Gerami, a masculinities theorist, argues that the colonialist narratives represented a Western hegemonic masculinity that is "white, Christian, heterosexual and dominant."'' 23 This hegemonic masculinity was
manifested in the physical and political domination over colonized
"Others," including Muslim societies and communities. Gerami argues that
Western colonial masculinities profoundly threatened the honor and power
of local Muslim masculinities. 2 4 As Gerami observes:
In Muslim societies, as in many other colonized cultures, the
colonial domination raised serious challenges to the local masculinities across the region. Men's honor was threatened, and they
were called upon to protect it. This catapulted women's veil to the
national and political scene as the symbol of men's honor. No
longer was women's honor particular to a clan, a tribe, or a man; it
25
became symbolic of the national honor.1
While Turkey was not a part of the colonial world, secularists and Islamists in Turkey have similarly used the female body and the headscarf to
construct and embody competing national and political identities. The new
Turkish Republic sought to distance itself from the Ottoman state. As Nora
Onar explains, "Turkey's founding fathers adopted the prevailing European
Orientalist view that Islam had been a source of Ottoman decline .... [and]

they sought to manoeuvre religion out of public life."' 26 Atatirk sought to
transform Turkey, both politically and culturally, in order to eliminate stereotypes of Turks as "backward" and "uncivilized."'' 27 He replaced the Ottoman Empire's Shari'a family code with the Swiss family code, which28
banned polygamy and gave women equal rights to divorce and custody.
which subverted the traditional OttoWomen were granted political rights,
29
man and Islamist gender order.
Atatfirk sought to replace the face of Islam with the public faces of
women who were modem and Western. 30 The uncovering of women
through the elimination of the headscarf was a critical component of the
22
1
123

Id.at 165.
Shahin Gerami, Islamist Masculinity and Muslim Masculinities, in

STUDIES ON MEn & MASCULIN

S,

supra note

Id. at 450.
Id.
1 Onar, supra note 11, at 10-11.
27
1 1d. at I1.
28
' AHMED, supra note 117, at 168.
129 Onar, supra note 11, at 10-11.
3
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AHMED, supra note 117, at 164.
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13, at 448, 449.
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Adopting Western and Ori-

entalist criticisms of the veil as barbaric and backwards, Atattirk implored
men to renounce the face veil or niqab:

In some places I have seen women who put a piece of cloth or a
towel or something like it over their faces ... when a man passes

by. What is the meaning and sense of this behavior? Gentlemen,
can the mothers and daughters of a civilised [sic] nation adopt this
strange manner, this barbarous posture? It is a spectacle that
makes the nation an object of ridicule. It must be remedied at
once. 132

Under the direction of Atattirk, the new Republic launched a public
relations campaign to unveil women. Photographs of women lounging by
the sea wearing Western bathing suits were circulated. 133 Turkey conducted
its first national beauty pageant in 1929, accompanied by calls from secular34
ist elites for women to show that they met European standards of beauty.
Women were urged to participate in pageants, showing off their bodies as
part of their "national duty" so that Turkey could be represented at international competitions. 3 ' 1inar argues that the unveiling of Muslim women
"reset the boundaries of the public and the private, which in turn served the
creation and institutionalization of a sense of secular, modern
nationhood."'

136

The movement to unveil women was part of the Kemalist campaign to
create the "Ideal Woman," no longer oppressed by Ottoman-Islamic rule,
but modern, emancipated, and fully visible in the public sphere as citizens.'37
Atatfirk adopted various reforms that concretely improved women's position
in Turkey. These reforms helped transform the lives of urban elite women,
replacing Islamic traditional and hierarchical gender relations with Western
civil law.'38 While women in urban areas began to adopt Westernized clothing,'39 the headscarf did not disappear from Turkish society.
In response to Atatiirk's efforts, conservative Islamist political parties
seized upon the headscarf to construct an identity of resistance, similarly
using the bodies of Turkish women as an embodied symbol. 14° As qinar
argues, "[w]hereas during its founding years the new state instituted its sec32
133

134

135
136

q31
1NAR,
AIMED,

supra note 11, at 59-60, 66.
supra note 117, at 164 (quoting Atatirk).

INAR, supra note 11, at 63-64.
Id. at 70-71.

Id. at 71.
Id. at 63.

137 See GOLE, supra note 11, at 73 ("It is clear that Kemalism encouraged physical
changes (removal of the veil and charshaf), urban and public exposure (companionship
of men and women in the same space), visibility of women, as well as the recognition of
their 38citizenship rights .... ").
1 See GOLE, supra note 11, at 76; Onar, supra note 11, at 11.
139

Arat, supra note 11, at 36.

"'4 IINAR,

supra note 11, at 74.
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ularism through the unveiling of the female body, the Islamist elite of the
1990s instituted their Islamism by reveiling the female body, similarly using
the body and its clothing as site from which their nationalist project was
articulated."' 41 The Islamists, including the conservative Refah Party, used
the reveiling of women to argue that women were liberating themselves
from the oppressive secular state. 142 The Refah Party "designat[ed] the Islamic headscarf as the banner of their political campaign. '1 43 Since then, the
headscarf has become a symbol of political Islam in Turkey. As G61e observes, political Islam has made itself visible through the veiling of women,
44
who serve as "the emblem of politicized Islam."'
While the Refah Party ultimately was closed by the Turkish Constitutional Court, the issue of the headscarf as a political symbol continues. The
AKP, while committed to secularism, has embraced the headscarf as a political issue, framing it within a human rights discourse that focuses on the
rights of women to religious freedom. 141 In response, secularists have continued to portray the headscarf as the embodiment of radical and political
Islam, committed to the146establishment of an Islamic state and the elimination
of Turkish secularism.
III.

TURKISH WOMEN AND COVERING: NEGOTIATING
COMPETING MASCULINITIES

While masculinities theory has focused primarily on relationships
among men, it is critical to consider the role of women within its analysis of
the social practice of gender. While secular and Islamic masculinities and
political parties have used women's bodies to construct competing claims for
national identity and power, women also have been active participants in this
debate. The headscarf issue has divided feminists, with "Islamist feminists"
and some secular feminists arguing that women have the right to religious
freedom and individual choice, and many (but not all) secular feminists arguing that the reveiling of women is part of a strategy to replace civil law
with Shari'a and to require the total covering of women as part of a repudia147
tion of liberal values.
141Id.

14 2 Id.

at 74.

143Id.

'44 GOLE, supra note 11, at 83.
1454;INAR, supra note 11, at 174.
'46 Id. at 173.
"IOnar, supra note 11, at 16 (explaining that some Islamist and post-modem feminists have argued against the ban while other (both liberal and less liberal) feminists
argue in favor of it); Ye~im Arat, From Emancipation to Liberation: The Changing Role
of Women in Turkey's PublicRealm, 54 J. IrA AFF. 107, 120 (2000) ("The relationship
of secular feminists to Islamist women with headscarves varied. While Kemalist feminists opposed the women with headscarves as threat to the secular foundations of the
Republic, some groups of secular feminists supported Islamist women's right to wear
them.").
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Western media has largely interpreted Islamic veiling as a symbol of
the forced subordination of women who have no choice but to cover.148 This
interpretation, shared by some feminists, has been deployed by France and
other Western nations to justify various bans on veiling over the past ten
years. 149 The Western or liberal assumption that women who veil lack free
choice, however, is disputed by many feminists and scholars in Turkey and
throughout the Middle East. Many Turkish feminist scholars and sociologists have concluded that the decision of the young university women to
cover reflects a deliberate choice-a choice to embrace political Islam, to
express their religious identity, and/or to challenge the secularist ban of religion in the public sphere. 50 Some Western scholars, including some feminists and critical race scholars, have also challenged this assumption by deessentializing the women who choose to cover, conducting interviews, and
studying empirically their decision and practice.' 5 '
Many of the young women who chose to wear the tarban in the 1980s
were reveiling; that is, they chose to cover even though their mothers or
grandmothers did not.'52 Like Leyla 5ahin, these were largely young, urban
women. 3 Typically, their mothers or grandmothers wore either the simple
ba§6rtiisii or did not cover. '14 In The Forbidden Modern, Gole interviews a

diverse range of young women who have chosen to cover. Through her
interviews, she concludes that many of the young, urban, and university women who cover do so "by their free wills."'55 Many of these women base
their choice upon their interpretation of Islam, learned through religious
study, and reject the traditional understanding of Islam held by their par148 See, e.g., Katherine Bullock, Challenging Media Representationsof the Veil: Contemporary Muslim Women's Re-Veiling Movement, 17 AM. J. ISLAMIC Soc. Sci. 22, 22
(2000) ("[the] popular western media image of the 'veil' as a symbol of Muslim women's oppression[,] ...gained full force during the colonial period as part of a discourse
about149the inferior status of women in Islam.").
See, e.g., JOAN WALLACH Scorr, THE POLITICS OF THE VEIL 2-4 (2007) (discussing
European opposition to Muslim veiling in France and elsewhere).
1I0
See, e.g,. Arat, supra note 147, at 119-20; qINAR, supra note 11, at 81-83; GOLE,
supra note 11, at 92; Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18, at 6-7 (discussing the reasons "why
and how a young, urban, and educated middle-class woman would decide to cover, by
her own volition, despite stigmatization and socialization" and how covering styles
"changed so much and became more fashionable, popular, and ordinary").
151 Adrien Katherine Wing and Monica Nigh Smith, for example, have argued that
the debate on the French headscarf ban has been heard through men's voices and that
critical race feminism, through its focus on anti-essentialism, could "provide a perspective to lift the veil of ignorance and misunderstanding concerning this recent French law
and its effect on young Muslim women." Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith,
CriticalRace Feminism Lifts the Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the HeadscarfBan,
39 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 743, 747-50, 758-74 (2006). Wing employed the "world-traveling" approach advocated by Isabelle Gunning and interviewed young French Muslim
women on both sides of the debate and reported the reasons that each side gave for their
position. Id. at 749.
152Bullock, supra note 148, at 23.
3 Secor, supra note 11, at 207.
15 Id.

"' GoLE, supra note 11, at 90-91.
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ents.' 56 Many (though not all) of these women have embraced tessetur as15a7
political symbol and a rejection of secularist political parties in Turkey.
Gole argues that "[t]he contemporary actors of Islamism are university students, future intellectuals, and professionals, not marginal, uneducated, frustrated groups."' 58 It is university women, she argues, that veil "as a political
statement."' 15 9 She explains:
The phenomenon of Islam, on the one hand, geographically moved
into urban settlements and, on the other, penetrated the central
power apparatus where modem cultural values and symbols are
created. Veiled women are not simply passive conveyors of the
provincial traditional culture; they are, rather, active and self-asserting women who seek opportunities in modernism. They have
come into the public scene not at the periphery, where traditions
prevail, but in the urban settlements and the universities, where
modernism flourishes. In this context veiling symbolizes radical
Islamism, which is molded on the tension between traditionalism
and modernism. 160

While ahin portrays the university women who chose to reveil as
under the influence of radical Islamist men, Turkish scholar Ye~im Arat observes that many women were part of the Islamist movement and that their
decision to cover their heads in universities was an act that required "courage and faith in oneself."'' Ironically, covering made these women more
visible. As Arat explains:
In a polity where religion had traditionally been controlled by the
state in the name of secularism, they stood for a criticism of this
secular order. Independent of what their private individual reasons
for covering the head might have been, they had to assume the
responsibility for what they meant in this particular situation. As
such, even though they might have acted in solidarity with members of their religious community, they were engaged in an act of
individuation and political resistance as they confronted the gaze
of the uncovered women who thought of them as different.'62
By the late 1990s, a variety of styles of covering emerged, featuring
tighter, more form-fitting jackets and stylish raincoats that skim the body
rather than hide it completely, smaller and beautifully colored headscarves,
and fabrics in a range of beautiful colors, often stylishly coordinated so that
Id.
Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18.
"I GOLE, supra note 11, at 96.

156

117

59
1
16 0 Id. at 95.
Id. at 92.
161

Arat, supra note 51, at 123.

162

Id.
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the entire outfit matches. 163 Contrary to Western media images of monotonously cloaked women, women who cover mingle freely with uncovered
women, symbolizing the acceptance of choice with respect to covering.

What is the meaning of the development of these newer styles of covering? In classical Islam, the purpose of the veil is to preserve modesty and to
avoid drawing attention to the female body. Yet in Turkey, the new form of
urban covering is beautiful and self-consciously stylish.',, Covering has become a profitable part of the fashion consumer market in Turkey and has
165
spread throughout the world via the Internet and global retail markets. It
is international and fashion-forward. A Turkish fashion show featuring the
various ways of covering can be found on YouTube. 166 In this show, tall and
lean women in high heels and narrow overcoats and tunics walk down the
catwalk to distinctively modem, synthesized Middle Eastern club music.
The headscarves depicted are close-fitting and draped over conical headpieces on the top of the head, evoking Orientalist notions of the hidden and
the exotic, Islamic dress meeting global capitalist consumerism.
(inar describes this aesthetic-which was opposed by Islamic intellectuals as transforming the headscarf from a symbol of religious and political
identity to symbol of high fashion in upper class society-as "Islamic haute
163

1d.

& Ger, supra note 18 (discussing the desire of many covered women in
Turkey
to
show
off their beauty).
165 Id.
'6 Video: YouTube.com, Turkish Hijab Catwalk 3 (2006), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OSTp3VuVM6o (last visited Mar. 13, 2010).
'4 Sandikci
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couture."' 67 The emergence of an "Islamic high culture," 4inar argues, destroys the secularist image of Islam as backward and lower class while highlighting class and regional collective identities in Turkey.68 Those women
who adopt the more fashionable forms of cover distinguish themselves from
the more traditional, rural, or low-income women who wear either the simple headscarf or the outdated long, light-colored raincoat. 16 9
The new veiling by young, educated Turkish women appears to reflect
the negotiation of their multiple identities as both Islamic and modem, political agents, religious women, and secular consumers in a globalized society. 170 The politicization of young, educated, and outspoken Turkish women
who challenge the regulation of their bodies in the body politic disrupts the
dominant and secular masculinity of the Turkish Republic as well as local
Islamic masculinities. As Gole explains, "[t]he new public visibility of
Muslim women, who are outspoken, militant, and educated, brings about a
evoked the traditional, subshift in the semiotics of veiling, which has long
7
servient domestic roles of Muslim women."' '
These women disrupt the narratives of Western and secular masculinities that construct the veil as a symbol of women's degradation by Islamic
men. Through their choice to reveil, Leyla ahin and other young, educated
women rejected the role of female victim that has been used to demonize
Islamic men and rationalize the compulsory deveiling of women by the secular state. 172 Yet by mobilizing within the political sphere to wear the headscarf, these young women also challenge the Islamic masculinities that
relegate women to a hidden and private sphere through their gendered construction of the mahrem.173 Within this context, the act of covering becomes
not merely a religious practice or duty, but an individuation of women, many

167 ;INAR,

supra note 11, at 89-90.

Id.
169 Sandikci & Ger, supra note 18.
17 See, e.g., id. at 128-30; Secor, supra note 11, at 208-10.
168

'7'

GOLE,

supra note 11, at 21.

"z ahin, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 226 (Tulkens, J., dissenting).
1 G61e explains that:
Woman's participation in Islamism has had unintended consequences; a latent
individuation of women is at work. Women, once empowered by their public and
professional visibility, continue to follow and develop personal life strategies. At
the same time, while never forgetting the primacy of their identities as mothers
and wives, women confront and criticize the Islamist ideology. The exit from the
mahrem . . .sphere forces women to question traditional gender identities and
male definitions of "licit" and "illicit" behavior, thereby unveiling relations of
power between Islamist men and women. Criticizing the "pseudoprotectionism"
of Muslim men, veiled women claim their right to "acquire personality" -that is,
"a life of their own"-and, consequently, provoke disorder in Islamic gender
definitions and identities.
GOLE,

supra note 11, at 22.
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of whom, as G61e argues, unveil and challenge traditional gender identities
17 4
within Islam and the body politic.
CONCLUSION

In Turkey and elsewhere, the veil has become a highly contested-and
gendered-political symbol. While feminist and critical race theorists have
focused on the decision of individual women to cover, the veil is not merely
a religious practice or individual choice. Scholarship that discusses the multiple reasons that Muslim women cover is a useful first step in analyzing
state regulation of veiling; it reveals the diversity among Muslim women and
emphasizes that for many women, the decision to cover is an autonomous
choice. But covering is not merely an individual choice; it is a religious and
social practice that constructs various collective identities within a particular
location at a particular time.
Masculinities theory examines how power is negotiated by and between
competing masculinities-at the local, national, and transnational levels. By
applying masculinities theory, the role of the headscarf in constructing the
Turkish nation and the relationship of the headscarf to the historical struggle
between the West and Islam become visible. Through the ban, the secularist
state regulates the presence of women in the public sphere, banning women
who cover from attending or teaching in universities or working in government offices. Both secularists and Islamist political parties have used the
veil, and the regulation of women's bodies, to embody competing notions of
the state and national identity. This local struggle for a hegemonic masculinity constructs local gender relations, yet it is also part of the historical and
contemporary struggle between the West and Islam.
Examining the relationship between masculinities and the state enriches
our understanding of the state as a gendered institution, illuminating the reciprocal relationship between the construction of the state and gender relations. It is important, however, that women remain a necessary and critical
focus of masculinities analysis and that masculinities theory incorporates
women more explicitly in its analysis of gender. Masculinities theorists conceptualize gender as a social practice, one that is constructed by and between
men and women and within institutions. The relationship between men and
women, therefore, is reciprocal. As can be seen in Turkey, the young Islamic university women who organized politically to challenge the headscarf
ban-the Leyla *ahins of the 1980s and 1990s-refused to conform to the
gendered expectations of either the secularists or the Islamists. Today, many
young women continue to incorporate their own version of tessetur, negotiating their religious beliefs with their sense of themselves as women in the
public, and global, sphere. As Turkish scholars like Nora Onar have sug-
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gested, these women have participated in the construction of a rights-based
discourse that may have important implications for Turkish secularism, even
though it remains an open question as to what extent the semiotics of veiling
align with the process of women's emancipation.

